In order for a portion of the BioShield Special Reserve Fund to be released for the purchase of a countermeasure for SNS, a series of actions must occur. 7 The first action, however, (and the one on which all later actions are based) is that "the Homeland Security
[DHS] Secretary, in consultation with the [Health and Human Services (HHS)] Secretary and the heads of other agencies as appropriate," must make a "determination" of "current and emerging threats of CBRN agents" that "present a material threat against the United States . . ." 8 Once that
"material threat assessment" is made, various government agencies, up to and including the President, through a series of decisions, then determine whether promising countermeasures may be purchased with the Special Reserve Fund to address those identified threats. The BioShield Act is an impressive starting point for the creation of a vibrant biodefense vaccine industry. It has many problems that must be corrected both administratively and legislatively, however. 19 Certainly, foremost among those problems is DHS' bureaucratic quagmire in identifying CBRN agents posing a material threat to the United States (thereby delaying the use of procurement efforts for well recognized CBRN dangers to this country).
No legislative fix is needed. What is required is aggressive Congressional prodding to have DHS abandon its unnecessary administrative morass. It requires directing the agency to follow the well worn path already trodden through scholarship and the work of the CDC to list quickly the full panoply of CBRN agents as material threats. Such an expedited effort would be an encouragement to both researchers and the vaccine industry that a broad array of efforts might be funded over the next decade by the BioShield Special Reserve Fund.
